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Local Government Law
by Kirk Fjelstul*
and James E. Elliott, Jr.**
This was another active year of litigation by, for, against, within, and
between local governments. The Article that follows includes appellate
decisions with unique, new, or instructive issues.'
I.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

While local government employees probably hope newly elected
officials will not challenge their employment contracts, they are likely
aware of the potential. In City ofMcDonough v. Campbell,2 the building
inspector filed a complaint against the City demanding severance pay
when the new mayor and council declared his contract null and void and
refused to pay his salary. Although the contract was upheld at trial
and in the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed and declared the employment contract ultra vires and void.4
The contract included an annual renewal provision that was automatic
unless terminated before October 30th of each year.5 In the case of
* Deputy Director, Georgia Regional Transportation Authority (GRTA). Adjunct
Professor, Georgia State University Law School. Drake University Law School (J.D., 1988);
Emory University Law School (LL.M., 1989). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** City Attorney, Warner Robins, Georgia. Adjunct Professor, Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law. Georgia Institute of Technology (B.S., 1979); Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Special thanks to Ken Jarrard, a partner in the firm of Jarrard & Davis, LLP in
Cumming, Georgia, who provided advice on the impact of changes to the Open Meetings
Act. Thanks also to Kenneth P. Brockman, a Georgia State University Law School student,
who contributed to the section on "Speech."
1. For an analysis of Georgia local government law during the prior survey period, see
Ken E. Jarrard, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L.
REV. 251 (2011).
2. 289 Ga. 216, 710 S.E.2d 537 (2011).
3. Id. at 216-17, 710 S.E.2d at 538.
4. Id. at 216-17, 219, 710 S.E.2d at 538, 540.
5. Id. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 538.
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termination, the contract called for "[twelve] months salary as severance
pay, plus insurance and retirement benefits."6 The supreme court, in
declaring the contract void, relied on the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section 36-30-3,' which prohibits one council from
"bind[ing] itself or its successors to prevent free legislation in matters of
municipal government."' The court noted that the prohibition applies
equally to the adoption of ordinances and to the approval of government
contracts, and that the prohibition is to be interpreted strictly in order
to carry out the intent of allowing local governments to legislate freely.9
The court concluded that the employment contract was void because the
contract automatically renewed unless terminated, and because the
severance provision requiring twelve-months pay plus benefits made the
cost of termination exorbitant, thereby restricting the ability of successor
councils to terminate the agreement.' °
II.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS

The Georgia Supreme Court was required to address another case
where the actions of local governing bodies may bind their successors. 1
Intergovernmental agreements are frequently used to memorialize longterm obligations between local governments, 2 but we were reminded
in City of Decatur v. DeKalb County 8 that they do have limitations. 4
The DeKalb County cities in City of Decatur executed a forty-nine-year
intergovernmental agreement with DeKalb County in 1998. The purpose
of the agreement was to memorialize the formula for distributing sales
tax proceeds among the jurisdictions from the Homestead Option Sales
and Use Tax (HOST), which was approved by the voters in 1997. More
than a decade of litigation followed, over what began in the year 2000
as a dispute over the distribution formula. 5 The litigation in this case
concluded in the summer of 2011 after a third trip to the Georgia
Supreme Court. 6

6. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3(a) (2012).
7. O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3.
8. Campbell, 289 Ga. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 538; see also O.C.G.A. § 36-30-3.
9. Campbell, 289 Ga. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Brown v. City of East Point,
246 Ga. 144, 146, 268 S.E.2d 912, 915 (1980)).
10. Id. at 218-19, 710 S.E.2d at 539-40.
11. City of Decatur v. DeKalb Cnty., 289 Ga. 612, 614, 713 S.E.2d 846, 849 (2011).
12. See Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga. App. 649,649, 627 S.E.2d 391, 395 (2006).

13.
14.
15.
16.

289 Ga. 612, 713 S.E.2d 846 (2011).
See id. at 614-15, 713 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 612-13, 713 S.E.2d at 847-48.
Id. at 613, 713 S.E.2d at 848.
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The court ruled, in the final version, that the intergovernmental
Local governments may not ordinarily
agreement was not valid.'
enter into contracts lasting longer than the "government's term of
office.""8 The Intergovernmental Contracts Clause in the 1983 Georgia
Constitution19 offers an exception that allows intergovernmental
agreements to last up to fifty years in length.2" Their purpose,
however, must be for the "pro,ision of services, or ...the joint or
separate use of facilities or equipment, [and] must deal with activities,
services, or facilities which the contracting parties are authorized by law
to undertake or provide."2 1 The court in City of Decatur declared the
intergovernmental agreement between the cities and DeKalb County
invalid because its "plain and unambiguous" purpose was to determine
how sales tax proceeds were to be divided.22 It was not an agreement
to provide services or address the use of facilities.'
III.

PUBLIC MEETINGS

The right of citizens under the Open Meetings Act' to know how
their local elected officials vote was at stake in Cardinale v. City of
Atlanta. 5 Its importance as case law, however, has likely faded as a
result of changes to the Open Meetings Act in 2012.26
Cardinaleconsidered a non-roll-call vote at a retreat of the Atlanta
City Council, where the council members were polled on their preference

17. Id.
18. Id. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Greene Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Greene Cnty., 278
Ga. 849, 850, 607 S.E.2d 881, 882 (2005)).
19. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1(a).
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also City of Decatur, 289 Ga. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 849 (quoting Greene
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 278 Ga. at 851, 607 S.E.2d at 882 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22. City of Decatur,289 Ga. at 614-15, 713 S.E.2d at 849.
23. Id. at 615, 713 S.E.2d at 849-50.
24. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 to -6 (2009 & Supp. 2012).
25. 290 Ga. 521, 521-22, 722 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2012).
26. O.C.GA § 50-14-1 (2009) was amended in 2012. Prior to legislative amendment,
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(eX2) provided:
In the case of a roll-call vote the name of each person voting for or against a
proposal shall be recorded and in all other cases it shall be presumed that the
action taken was approved by each person in attendance unless the minutes
reflect the name of the persons voting against the proposal or abstaining.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2) (2009). The 2012 amendments removed the reference to roll-call
votes at O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(eX2)(B) (Supp. 2012): "The name of each person voting for or
against a proposal shall be recorded. It shall be presumed that the action taken was
approved by each person in attendance unless the minutes reflect the name of the persons
voting against the proposal or abstaining." O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2) Supp. 2012).
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to change certain council rules. Observers of the vote noted that eight
council members opposed a change and seven favored a change. The
minutes did not record the vote, only noting that the council was not in
favor of changes.27
The issue was whether a non-roll-call vote pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 50-14-1(eX2) 8 of the Open Meetings Act, which was in effect at the
time, required a listing of which members cast the yes and no votes.'
The arguments revolved around the legislative distinction in the Act
between roll-call and non-roll-call votes; roll-call votes required a record
of all persons voting for and against the proposal.30 In all other cases,
the vote is presumed unanimous unless the "minutes reflect the name
of the persons voting against the proposal or abstaining."31
In reversing both the trial court and the Georgia Court of Appeals, the
Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the City must record the council
members voting against the proposal in a non-roll-call vote.32 The
court reasoned that declining to record negative votes or abstentions
would "potentially deny [the] non-attending members of the public access
to information available to those who attended [the] meeting. Such a
result conflicts with the Act's goal of greater governmental transparency."3 The court further reasoned that when no names are recorded,
the public should be able to presume that the vote was unanimous.3
Subsequent to Cardinale, the General Assembly made substantial
changes to the Open Meetings Act, including elimination of the reference
to either roll-call or non-roll-call votes.35 The reference to a roll-call
vote prior to the 2012 ameidments seemed to be at the heart of the
dispute that led to the litigation in Cardinale.3 Now the Act simply
requires that all non-unanimous votes record the name of each person
voting for or against a proposal.37 The Act creates a presumption that
a vote was unanimous in favor of an item unless the minutes reflect a
person has voted against an item or abstained."

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Cardinale,290 Ga. at 522, 722 S.E.2d at 734.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2).
Cardinale, 290 Ga. at 521-22, 722 S.E.2d at 734.
Id. at 523, 722 S.E.2d at 735; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2).
Cardinale,290 Ga. at 523, 722 S.E.2d at 735; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2).
Cardinale,290 Ga. at 524, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 524-25, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 525, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(e)(2)(B).
Cardinale,290 Ga. at 521-22, 722 S.E.2d at 734.
See id. at 524, 722 S.E.2d at 736; see also O.C.GA § 50-14-1(eX2)(B).
See O.C.GA. § 50-14-1(eX2)B).

20121

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

IV.

217

SPEECH

If the right to free speech includes the right to question, then the
Georgia Supreme Court certainly had the right to question its own free
speech analysis in Grady v. United Government of Athens-Clarke
County.3 9 In that case, the court upheld the constitutionality of a local
noise ordinance challenged by a student who hosted a late-night party
at his home.40
Apparently, the loud party noise and noise from
"mechanical sound-making devices" could be heard more than 170 feet
away.41 Unfortunately, the local noise ordinance for the zoning district
prohibited "plainly audible" noises that could be heard from a distance
of more than 100 feet. When the plaintiff was convicted of violating
the ordinance, he challenged it as invalid under the free speech clause
of the Georgia Constitution."
More interesting than the result is the court's review of its free speech
test and its invitation for future litigants to test the framework." The
plaintiff in Grady, relying on Statesboro Publishing Co. v. City of
Sylvania," asserted that the noise ordinance was unconstitutional
because it was not the "least restrictive means" of furthering the local
government's interest in regulating noise, which he argued was the
proper test for cases seeking free speech protection under the Georgia
Constitution.46 The court in Grady devoted the majority of its opinion
to unraveling the history of Georgia's free speech standard, particularly
in relation to Statesboro. v
According to the court, in 1999 Statesboro broke from the historical
analysis of Georgia's free speech clause, which until then mirrored the
analysis of First Amendment claims arising under the United States
Constitution.' That First Amendment test requires an ordinance be
"'narrowly tailored' to serve a significant government interest and leaven
open ample alternatives for communication." 9 In Statesboro, the court

39. 289 Ga. 726, 715 S.E.2d 148 (2011).
40. Id. at 726-27, 736, 715 S.E.2d at 149, 155.
41. Id. at 727, 715 S.E.2d at 149.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 731, 715 S.E.2d at 151-52.
45. 271 Ga. 92, 516 S.E.2d 296 (1999).
46. Grady, 289 Ga. at 728, 715 S.E.2d at 149-50 (citing Statesboro, 271 Ga. at 93-95,
516 S.E.2d at 297-98).
47. Id. at 726-36, 715 S.E.2d at 148-55.
48. Id. at 729, 715 S.E.2d at 150-51 (citing Statesboro,271 Ga. at 92-93, 516 S.E.2d at
297).
49. Id. at 728, 715 S.E.2d at 150 (citing Statesboro, 271 Ga. at 93, 516 S.E.2d at 297).
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advanced the proposition that Georgia's free speech guarantee is broader
than its federal counterpart, a proposition previously addressed only in
The court in Statesboro then abandoned the "narrow
dictum.5"
tailoring" test and adopted a more stringent "least restrictive means"
test, which had only been advocated in a minority dissent. 5' The
Statesboro test requires that the ordinance be the "least restrictive
while still
means of furthering the governinent's significant5 interests,
2
leaving open ample alternatives to communicate."
In analyzing the new Statesboro precedent, the court in Grady found
the inconsistencies between Statesboro and prior precedent troubling
because no authority was cited in support of the new test, and no reason
The court in Grady, however,
for the change was articulated.5 3
stopped short of overruling Statesboro because neither party challenged
the test.54 Instead, the court held that the challenged ordinance could
withstand scrutiny under either test.5 The court then invited future
litigants to challenge the Statesboro test: "We therefore leave further
consideration of this important issue for a future case."56
V.

ANTE LITEM NOTICE

What are the ante litem notice rules for class action lawsuits? This
was the question of first impression addressed by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in a group of consolidated cases heard in City of Atlanta v.
Benator.57 Parties intending to file a lawsuit to recover for certain
injuries against a local government in Georgia must, as a statutory
prerequisite, first serve the local government with an ante litem
notice.5" The purpose of the notice requirement is to allow local
governments the opportunity to investigate claims and to determine
whether they should be settled in advance of litigation.59 The plaintiffs
in Benator, in multiple lawsuits, asserted class action claims against the
City of Atlanta and its contractors on various grounds related to alleged

50. Id. at 729, 715 S.E.2d at 150-51; Statesboro,271 Ga. at 93-95, 516 S.E.2d at 297-98.
51. Grady, 289 Ga. at 729-30, 715 S.E.2d at 151; Statesboro, 271 Ga. at 93-95, 516
S.E.2d at 297-98.
52. Grady, 289 Ga. at 728, 715 S.E.2d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing

Statesboro, 271 Ga. at 92, 516 S.E.2d at 296).
53. Id. at 730, 715 S.E.2d at 151.
54. Id. at 731, 715 S.E.2d at 152.
55. Id. at 732, 715 S.E.2d at 152.
56. Id. at 731, 715 S.E.2d at 152.
57. 310 Ga. App. 597, 599, 714 S.E.2d 109, 112 (2011).
58. Id. at 598, 714 S.E.2d at 111-12; see also O.C.GA. § 36-33-5 (2012).
59. Benator, 310 Ga. App. at 599-600, 714 S.E.2d at 112-13 (quoting City of Gainesville
v. Moss, 108 Ga. App. 713, 715, 134 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1963)).
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overcharges for water and sewer usage.6 ° The court consolidated the
cases and then disposed of the issues raised in motions to dismiss filed
by the City.6 ' The City contended in the first of the consolidated cases

that the claims should be dismissed against all but the first named
plaintiff because she was the only plaintiff identified in the ante litem
notice. 2
The court agreed with the City, reversing the trial court on this issue,
thereby granting the City's motion to dismiss the non-contract damages
of the named plaintiffs who failed to meet the notice requirements. 3
The ruling meant that each named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit is
required to serve a proper ante litem notice." The court recognized
that setting the ante litem rules in class action cases was an issue of
first impression, but it relied on a related precedent to reach its conclusion.6 ' The court in Goen v. City of Atlanta,66 for example, held that
a separate ante litem notice is required for each named plaintiff in a
non-class action lawsuit.6 7 In other circumstances, where pre-litigation
notice is required, proper notice by the named plaintiffs is sufficient for
unnamed class members in a class action.68
According to the court, requiring that each named plaintiff in a
purported class action serve a proper ante litem notice supports the
public policy intention of ante litem statutes.6 9 It allows local governments to more fully investigate claims of each class representative, to
better evaluate the likelihood of class certification, and to assess
potential exposure.70 It would also promote judicial economy in the
event class certification is not granted.7'

60. Id. at 597, 714 S.E.2d at 111.
61. Id. at 597-98, 714 S.E.2d at 111.
62. Id. at 599, 714 S.E.2d at 112.
63. Id. at 600-01, 714 S.E.2d at 113. While the court granted the City's motion to
dismiss regarding claims for money damages on account of injuries to person or property,
the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the other counts. The remaining claims did not
seek "money damages" but rather sought restitution of overpayment. Id.
64. Id. at 600, 714 S.E.2d at 113.
65. Id. at 599, 714 S.E.2d at 112.
66. 224 Ga. App. 484, 481 S.E.2d 244 (1997).
67. Id. at 485, 481 S.E.2d at 246.
68. Benator, 310 Ga. App. at 599, 714 S.E.2d at 244.

69. Id. at 600, 714 S.E.2d at 113.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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VESTED RIGHTS

While creating new municipalities is popular, it is inevitable that
complications occur as the affected land transitions from being regulated
by counties to cities.72 Fulton County v. Action Outdoor Advertising,
JV, LLC,73 presented just such an example. Between 2003 and 2006,
several billboard companies and others with asserted legal interests
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "sign companies") filed-but were
denied-permits throughout unincorporated Fulton County based on
provisions of the County's sign ordinance. The sign companies fied
lawsuits contending that the ordinance was unconstitutional.74 After
the lawsuits were filed and consolidated, and while they were pending,
the Georgia Supreme Court ruled in another case, Fulton County v.
7 5 that Fulton County's sign ordinance was unconstitutional
Galberaith,
pursuant to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.76
As a result, the trial court in Action Outdoor Advertising granted
summary judgment to the sign companies, found they had vested rights
to billboards, and ordered they be allowed to erect the billboards.77 The
County appealed, but at some point during the appeal's pendency, the
cities of Sandy Springs, Milton, and Johns Creek were newly incorporated within Fulton County.78 Since the new municipalities all included

property where the sign companies' permits were denied (the City of
Alpharetta also annexed unincorporated land where an application had
7
been filed), the County questioned its jurisdiction to issue the permits.
Similarly, the municipalities questioned their obligation to issue permits
because the applications had been fied with the County, prior to
incorporation or annexation.' In response, the sign companies fied a
new action against the cities seeking mandamus."' The trial court
granted summary judgment to the sign companies on the grounds that
their rights to erect billboards vested, in accordance with the laws that

72. See Fulton Cnty. v. Action Outdoor Adver., JV, LLC, 289 Ga. 347, 347-48, 711
S.E.2d 682, 684 (2011).
73. 289 Ga. 347, 711 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
74. Id. at 347, 711 S.E.2d at 684.
75. 282 Ga. 314, 647 S.E.2d 24 (2007).
76. Action OutdoorAdver., 289 Ga. at 347, 711 S.E.2d at 684; Galberaith,282 Ga. at
319, 647 S.E.2d at 28.
77. Action Outdoor Adver., 289 Ga. at 347-48, 711 S.E.2d at 684.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 348, 711 S.E.2d at 684.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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existed, 82as of the date the valid permit applications were filed in Fulton
County.
The Georgia Supreme Court consolidated both versions of Action
Outdoor Advertising and upheld the trial court decisions.83 The court
affirmed the breadth of Galberaith, holding that the entire sign
ordinance was invalid, thereby leaving no regulations in place at the
time the permit applications were filed by the sign companies.84 The
court reasoned that the ordinance's structure of presuming all signs to
be illegal, and then allowing them on a case-by-case basis, violated the
As a result, the entire ordinance was invalid,
First Amendment.'
leaving it void from the date of enactment.8 6 With no valid ordinance
in place at the time the applications were filed, the right to erect
billboards vested upon filing.87
The cities argued that the subsequent incorporations and annexation
where the properties were located divested the sign companies of their
vested rights." The court rejected that argument, based on article I,
section 1, paragraph 10 of the Georgia Constitution, 9 which "forbids
passage of retroactive laws which injuriously affect the vested rights of
The court concluded that creation of new cities and
citizens."90
annexation of property could not retroactively divest the sign companies
of their vested property rights. 91
While Action Outdoor Advertising exemplifies the vested rights
problems that arise for local governments when an entire ordinance is
declared unconstitutional,92 Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City
of Marietta93 points to the difficulty property owners may have in
acquiring vested rights when only a portion of an ordinance is declared

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 348-49, 711 S.E.2d at 685.
85. Id. at 348, 711 S.E.2d at 685.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 349, 711 S.E.2d at 685.
88. Id. at 350-51, 711 S.E.2d at 686.
89. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10.
90. Action OutdoorAdver., 289 Ga. at 351,711 S.E.2d at 686 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10.
91. Action Outdoor Adver., 289 Ga. at 351, 711 S.E.2d at 686. The court also
determined that that there was no other ordinance prohibiting the erection of signs and
other rulings, that the ownership interests were sufficient to grant standing, and that the
backdating provisions of O.C.GA. § 36-60-26 had no application. Id. at 349-52, 711 S.E.2d
at 685-87; see also O.C.G.A. § 36-60-26 (2012).
92. See Action OutdoorAdver., 289 Ga. at 352, 711 S.E.2d at 687.
93. 654 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2011).
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unconstitutional.' In Covenant ChristianMinistries, the plaintiff was
a church and a private school in the City of Marietta looking for land to
build a new and larger campus. It contracted in 2004 to purchase eight
acres in an R-2 low-density residential zoning district that allowed
religious institutions to purchase land, subject to a five-acre minimum
lot restriction. 95
A few weeks after the purchase contract was executed in 2004, the
96
City amended the ordinance as a consequence of an unrelated lawsuit.

The plaintiff alleged that the five-acre minimum for religious institutions
violated a federal law known as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)." It asserted a violation because the lot
requirement did not apply equally to religious and non-religious
institutions and places of assembly.98 The 2004 amended ordinance
prohibited all religious institutions in several residential districts but
still allowed other assemblies such as parks, playgrounds, and recreation
centers. About a year later, in 2005, the church closed on the property,
but unfortunately did nothing to determine whether the ordinance had
changed. The church learned about the 2004 amended ordinance in
2006 when it sought a development permit. The City informed the
church of the change and directed it to seek a rezoning. 99
The church filed a lawsuit in federal court when the rezoning
application was denied. 10 0 It challenged the 2004 amended ordinance
as well as most of the litigated claims related to asserted violations of
RLUIPA and to violations of vested rights.10 ' The church requested
injunctive relief in the form of a directive to issue development permits
and damages.'
The trial court in Covenant Christian Ministries ruled, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, that the 2004 amended ordinance prohibiting
all religious institutions from the R-2 district violated the equal terms
provision of RLUIPA because the ordinance treated religious institutions
or assemblies on "less than equal terms with non-religious assemblies

94. See id. at 1236-37.
95. Id. at 1236.

96. Id.
97. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
98. Covenant ChristianMinistries,Inc., 654 F.3d at 1237.
99. Id. at 1236-37.
100. Id. at 1237.
101. Id. It is a little unclear what was asserted at trial because the Eleventh Circuit

notes that many of the claims were not briefed and thus were deemed abandoned. Id. at
1237 n.1.
102. Id at 1237.
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and institutions--namely private parks, playgrounds, and neighborhood
recreation centers."0 3
Although the church won the proverbial battle, it lost the war when
the remedy fashioned by the trial court was far different from what was
requested. Rather than impose the requested injunction and direct the
issuance of development permits, the trial court severed portions of the
ordinance so that it was no longer in violation of RLUIPA.'" The trial
court severed the ordinance by striking all of the non-religious places of
assembly (parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers) from the list of
permitted uses in the R-2 zoning district, thereby eliminating the
unequal treatment.0 5 In the view of both the trial court and the
Eleventh Circuit, this action was consistent with Georgia law for
severing ordinances because the stricken uses were not mutually
dependant on the remaining ordinance sections, and the severing action
did not compromise the legislative intent of the R-2 zoning district (lowdensity single family). 0 6
Because the court did not strike the entire zoning ordinance, or
otherwise fashion a remedy that allowed religious institutions, the
church did not get its development permit. 107 Neither the 2004
amended ordinance, nor the court's remedy, permitted religious

103. Id. at 1237-38. In reaching that conclusion, the court outlined the four-part test
for a prima facie showing: "(1) the plaintiff must be a religious assembly or institution, (2)

subject to a land use regulation, that (3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal
terms, with (4) a nonreligious assembly or institution." Id. at 1245 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Once a prima facie showing of a violation is made, the City is subject to
strict scrutiny in showing that the regulation "employs a narrowly tailored means of
achieving a compelling government interest." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The

City argued that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers should not be classified as
assemblies because people do not necessarily assemble for a common purpose. Id. at 124546. The argument was rejected because assembly within the meaning of RLUIPA is simply
a place where "groups or individuals dedicated to similar purposes... can meet together."
Id. at 1246 (internal quotation marks omitted). Parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers

offer the opportunity to meet for a common purpose, which is sufficient under RLUIPA.
The City argued that even if the ordinance is subject to strict scrutiny, it passes the test
because there is a compelling interest in preserving the residential character of the zoning

district from traffic, crowds, and disruption. Id. at 1246. The argument was rejected
because parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers have the same potential for disruption.
Id.
104. Id. at 1238.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1240.
107. Id.
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As a result, the church never

acquired a vested right to construct a church on the property.1 9
The final disappointment was the nominal damage award of one
dollar."0 The court refused to allow additional damages because all of
the damage claims stemmed from the inability to construct the
church."' Although the court ruled in favor of the church on one of
the claims, it never acquired the right to construct or operate the
church.112
VII.

HIGH-SPEED PURSUIT

Georgia's courts, legislators, and law enforcement agencies have
struggled with the topic of law enforcement officers' liability to third
parties in high-speed pursuits." 3 Their struggles have principally
focused on two issues: (1) the circumstances under which law enforcement officers are immune from lawsuits in high-speed pursuits;" and
(2) the circumstances under which law enforcement officers can be the
legal cause of injuries to third parties when immunity has been
waived." 5 The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed both issues in two
separate cases, McCobb v. Clayton County"6 and Strength v. Lovett," 7 during the survey period. Although the two issues are easy to
point out, the arguments are so interrelated that it is difficult to
separate the discussion.
Sovereign immunity is immunity from being subject to a lawsuit;" 8
the threshold issue, therefore, is whether or not immunity is waived." 9
Causation and other liability issues are addressed only when immunity
is waived and the lawsuit is allowed to proceed. 20 Georgia's Constitution grants sovereign immunity to local governments and allows a
waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by specific act of the
The immunity waiver statute that was the
General Assembly.'

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 1241-43.
Id. at 1238.
Id.
Id. at 1247.
See, e.g., Peeples v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. App. 888, 377 S.E.2d 889 (1989).
Strength v. Lovett, 311 Ga. App. 35, 38-39, 714 S.E.2d 723, 726-27 (2011).
McCobb v. Clayton Cnty., 309 Ga. App. 217, 222, 710 S.E.2d 207, 212 (2011).
309 Ga. App. 217, 710 S.E.2d 207 (2011).
311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011).
McCobb, 309 Ga. App. at 217-18, 710 S.E.2d at 209.
Id. at 218, 710 S.E.2d at 209.
Id.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
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subject of both McCobb and Strength was O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51,122 which

generally waives immunity -for claims arising from the negligent use of
insured motor vehicles.' The statute authorizes:
a county to secure insurance to cover liability for damages on account
of bodily injury, death, and property damage "arising by reason of [the
county's] ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of any motor
vehicle" and provides that the county's sovereign immunity "for a loss
arisingout of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is
waived." '

If immunity is waived and the lawsuit proceeds, proximate cause is
still required for a law enforcement officer's liability to attach. 125 In
the case of liability to third parties during a high-speed pursuit, a state
statute limits proximate cause by raising the liability standard beyond
negligence."2' O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) provides:
When a law enforcement officer in a law enforcement vehicle is
pursuing a fleeing suspect in another vehicle and the fleeing suspect
damages any property or injures or kills any person during the pursuit,
the law enforcement officer's pursuit shall not be the proximate cause
or a contributing proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death
caused by the fleeing suspect unless the law enforcement officer acted
with reckless disregardfor proper law enforcement procedures in the
officer's decision to initiate or continue the pursuit .... '27

The code section was amended in 2002 to address liability in high-speed
pursuits in response to a Georgia Supreme Court holding that "the
decision of an officer to initiate or continue a pursuit of a fleeing suspect
in some cases 12may be the proximate cause of injuries sustained by a
third person." 1

122. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2005).
123. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b); Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 38-39, 714 S.E.2d at 726-27;
McCobb, 309 Ga. App at 222, 710 S.E.2d at 212.
124. McCobb, 309 Ga. App at 218, 710 S.E.2d at 209 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added); see also O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51.
125. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) (2011).

126. Id.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 40, 714 S.E.2d at 727 (citing Mixon v. City of Warner
Robins, 264 Ga. 385, 387, 444 S.E.2d 761, 764 (1994), superseded by statue, Ga. H.R. Bill

1128, Reg. Sess. (2002)). In Mixon, the Georgia Supreme Court looked to Texas law as it
crafted a new rule of law:
[W]e find persuasive a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Texas analyzing
the same competing public policies involved in this case. In Travis v. City of
Mesquite, the court relied upon a Texas statute containing language identical with
that of [O.C.G.A.] § 40-6-6(d) in providing that the statutory authorization to
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The first of the two cases, McCobb v. Clayton County," primarily
addressed sovereign immunity."' Sherri McCobb, the mother of the
deceased, brought a wrongful death suit against Clayton County alleging
that reckless conduct by a county police officer during a high-speed chase
resulted in the death of her son, who was a passenger in a fleeing
vehicle. The trial court dismissed McCobb's action based on sovereign
immunity and did not rule on liability. Although the plaintiff pled that
the County carried liability insurance for the asserted claims, thereby
waiving immunity in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51, the trial
court found that immunity was not waived.'' Citing dicta in Peeples
v. City of Atlanta,3 2 the lower court reasoned that the plaintiff's claims
failed to show that the use of the vehicle for which insurance had been
purchased caused the victim's injuries because there was no assertion
that the officer "literally used his vehicle to push the [driver's] vehicle
off of the road and into the tree. "1 3e
On appeal the court rejected the trial court's analysis, holding that the
trial court's reliance on Peeples was "misplaced."1" Contrary to the
dicta in Peeples, the court ruled that establishing a waiver of sovereign
immunity pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 does not require that the

disregard applicable traffic regulations does not "relieve the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety
of all persons."
Mixon, 264 Ga. at 389,444 S.E.2d at 765 (citation omitted) (quoting Travis, 830 S.W.2d at
98 n.2).
We recognize that police officers must make their decisions about pursuing a

fleeing suspect rapidly while under pressure, but we have concluded that there is
no special statutory provision excepting police officers from the [general] legal
standards for proximate cause. Police officers must balance the risk to the public

with their duty to enforce the law to choose an appropriate course of conduct.
Public safety should not be thrown to the winds in the heat of the chase .... The
decision to initiateor continuepursuit may be negligent when the heightened risk
of injury to thirdpartiesis unreasonablein relation to the interest in apprehending
suspects ....
The intervention of negligent or even reckless behavior by the

driver of the car whom the police pursues does not... require the conclusion that
there is a lack of proximate cause between police negligence and an innocent
victim's injuries.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 98-99).
129. 309 Ga. App. 217, 710 S.E.2d 207 (2011).
130. See id. at 217-18, 710 S.E.2d at 209-10.

131. Id. at 217, 710 S.E.2d at 209.
132. 189 Ga. App. 888, 377 S.E.2d 889 (1989).
133. McCobb, 309 Ga. App. at 219, 710 S.E.2d at 210 (alteration in original).

134. Id. at 220, 710 S.E.2d at 210.
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covered vehicle be used to intentionally and physically contact a
suspect's vehicle.'
The County argued that there was no waiver of immunity in what, as
a practical matter, would have been a "Catch-22" for the plaintiffs by
pitting the immunity waiver's negligence standard against the reckless
disregard standard required for liability in high-speed pursuits. The
County contended that when the plaintiff asserted an immunity waiver
by the purchase of insurance arising from the negligent use of a motor
vehicle pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51, she was precluded from
asserting the higher reckless disregard standard required by O.C.G.A.
§ 40-6-6(dX2) to prove causation in a high-speed pursuit case. 36 The
court in McCobb rejected the idea that the General Assembly intended
to preclude high-speed pursuit claims from a waiver of immunity as
"nonsensical on its face," noting the statute "could have simply said so"
if that had been the intention.'37 Instead, the court observed that the
statute is located within a section of the Georgia Code that subjects
claims against local governments to the procedures and limitations of
Chapter 92 of Title 36, which in turn expressly references the immunity
waiver at issue." As a result, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court and remanded the case to proceed on the merits.3 9
Shortly after McCobb, the court of appeals was again required to
address the sovereign immunity and causation issues resulting from a
high-speed chase. In Strength v. Lovett,"4 Laura Felder's estate filed
a wrongful death suit against Strength, the Sheriff of Richmond County,
alleging that a deputy's actions in continuing the pursuit of an already
identified misdemeanant was in reckless disregard of proper police
procedures,14 ' thus satisfying the proximate cause standard estab14
lished by the high-speed pursuit statute (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(dX2)). 1
The sheriff moved for summary judgment based on an asserted
entitlement to sovereign immunity and an asserted lack of legal

135. Id. at 221, 710 S.E.2d at 211.
136. Id. at 220-21, 710 S.E.2d at 211.
137. Id. at 221, 710 S.E.2d at 211.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 222, 710 S.E.2d at 212. Although the issue on appeal was immunity, the
court briefly addressed liability to the extent the county was arguing in reliance on Peeples

that a fleeing suspect colliding with a third party became the sole intervening cause as a
matter of law. The court of appeals held that such a position is contrary to O.C.G.A. § 406-6(d)(2). Id. at 220, 710 S.E.2d at 210-11.
140. 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011).

141. Id. at 35, 714 S.E.2d at 724.
142.

Id. at 43, 714 S.E.2d at 729; see O.C.GA § 40-6-6(dX2).
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causation from the officer's decision to continue the high-speed pursuit.
The motion was denied, and the sheriff appealed."4
The court of appeals in Strength did not devote much time addressing
the immunity issue. It simply upheld the trial court ruling and relied
on McCobb because the sheriff's immunity arguments were essentially
44
the same as those it rejected in McCobb several months earlier.'
After disposing of the immunity defense, the court turned to the two
causation arguments raised by the sheriff. 45 First, the sheriff contended there was no evidence in this case that the officer's "decision to
initiate or continue the pursuit"was in"reckless disregardof proper law
enforcement procedures,"as is required to meet the statutory proximate
cause standard in high-speed pursuits under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2).'"
The court reviewed the deputy's actions in the context of the
Richmond County Sheriff's pursuit policy to determine if evidence
existed from which a jury might find the deputy acted in reckless
disregard of the department policy when he decided to continue the
pursuit.'47 The Richmond County policy required that the deputy
balance the need to "immediately apprehend a fleeing suspect against
the risk to the officer and the public of initiating or continuing a
pursuit." 4 ' The policy also provided that "strong consideration should
be given to abandoning a pursuit" whenever "the subject can be
identified 49 to the point where later apprehension can be accom"1
plished.

The court reviewed the record and found evidence upon which a jury
could conclude that the deputy acted in reckless disregard of the
policy.'5 ° The court noted that the suspect, Clark, was initially alleged
to have committed only traffic violations, that the deputy had no
intention of taking him into custody prior to the pursuit, and that the
deputy knew Clark's identity and had physical possession of his driver's
license.' 5 ' As the chase ensued, the deputy observed Clark's reckless
behavior including excessive speed, the overtaking of other vehicles, and

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 35, 714 S.E.2d at 724.
Id. at 38-39, 714 S.E.2d at 726-27.
See id. at 39, 714 S.E.2d at 727.
Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(dX2) (emphasis added).
Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 40-41, 714 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 41, 714 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 42, 714 S.E.2d at 728-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 41-42, 714 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 41-42, 714 S.E.2d at 728-29.
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violation of traffic signals.'52 153 Finally, the deputy's field supervisor
end.

directed that the pursuit
The sheriff next contended that the manner of the deputy's driving
should be examined, rather than the deputy's decision to continue the
pursuit, to determine whether the actions were reckless. The sheriff
5 where the court concluded that
relied on Pearson v. City of Atlanta,"
the plaintiff failed to prove proximate cause because there was no
evidence that the pursuing officer operated his vehicle in a reckless
manner.'
The court in Strength expressly "disapprove[d]" Pearson,
relying instead on the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(dX2), which
precludes a law enforcement officer's high-speed pursuit as proximate
cause unless the law enforcement officer "acted with reckless disregard
for proper law enforcement procedures in [the officer's] decision to
initiate or continue the pursuit."5 ' As a result, the court upheld the
trial court's
denial of summary judgment on the issue of proximate
1 57
cause.

In the second causation argument, the sheriff contended that there
was no proof that the deputy was the cause in fact of the collision
because there was no proof that the deputy's decision to continue the
pursuit caused the suspect.to collide with the third party. 58 The court
chose not to address the issue because it had not been reviewed properly
by the trial court.'59 Instead, it vacated a portion of the lower court
60
order and directed that cause in fact be examined by the trial court.

152. Id. at 41-42, 714 S.E.2d at 728.
153. Id. at 37, 714 S.E.2d at 725-26. There was some dispute, however, as to whether
the deputy heard the directive.
154. 231 Ga. App 96, 499 S.E.2d 89 (1998).
155. Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 43, 714 S.E.2d at 729-30 (citing Pearson,231 Ga. App.
at 98-99, 499 S.E.2d at 89).
156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2).
157. Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 43, 714 S.E.2d at 730.
158. Id. at 39, 714 S.E.2d at 727.
159. Id. at 44, 714 S.E.2d at 730.
160. Id. at 45, 714 S.E.2d at 731.

